Abstract: This paper examines exchange-rate exposure of multinationals (MNEs) in light of detailed exchange rate data. Specifically, using MNE-specific exchange rates and accounting for the possibility that exchange-rate crises may impact a firm differently than periods of normal fluctuations, estimates suggest ¼ of all MNEs had significant exchange rate exposure between 1995 and 1999. On average, significant exposure is estimated to be 0.68, indicating that a firm's monthly return falls, on average, by 0.68 percentage points when the dollar appreciates one percent. This encompasses periods where there are normal fluctuations in the exchange rate and the average exposure is estimated to be 0.55, as well as crisis periods where the average exposure is estimated to be 2.8. Finally, results illustrate that MNEs operating in more than 20 countries (having more than 30 subsidiaries) have twice the exposure of MNEs operating in one country (having one subsidiary).
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Introduction
Estimating exchange-rate exposure began with a very simple model, such as Jorion (1990) , where a firm's return was regressed on the market return and exchange rate movement. Results suggested that there was not much exposure, which was unsatisfying given the casual evidence heard in the media. As a result, the literature evolved to more detailed analysis such as bringing in trade shares and markups and, Bodnar, Dumas and Marston (2001) examining pass-through effects. These studies found more significant exposure, but in the process added a lot of bells and whistles.
Here I step back to the simple Jorion framework and focus on more detailed exchange rate issues. Using a sample of U.S. nonfinancial multinationals (MNEs) over the 1995:1-1999:12 period, I estimate monthly exchange-rate exposure accounting for two items. First, I construct a more accurate exchange rate basket for each MNE based on the number and location of their subsidiaries.
Second, I allow for months with exchange-rate crises to affect a firm differently than months of normal exchange rate fluctuations. Results suggest that accounting for both these items increases the evidence of significant exchange-rate exposure to ¼ of the firms in the sample.
In most existing studies of exposure a broad measure of the exchange rate is used in the analysis, where bilateral exchange rates are typically weighted by U.S. trade flows. One can easily understand how a broad exchange rate may not be relevant for a firm, especially an MNE that has operations in only a few countries. By creating firm-specific exchanges for each MNE in the sample and using these exchange rates in the simple Jorion model, I find the number of U.S. MNEs' with significant exposure rises from 10 percent in the standard Jorion estimate to 16 percent, this is a significant change in the number of firms with significant exposure. Next I consider the fact that small movements in the exchange rate may not be very significant to a firm's balance sheet, but, perhaps, large movements in the exchange rate are costly to a firm. One often hears about companies whose operations are affected by an exchange-rate crisis quite rapidly after a onset of a crisis.
1 This is suggestive that firms' returns are affected by drastic changes in the exchange rate because of the large impact on their cashflow. This idea differs from Chow, Lee and Solt (1997) who argue changes in the exchange rate affect short-term and long-term cashflows, but current exchange-rate changes can be hedged or the cashflow effects are offset by interest-rate effects. They conclude that cashflow effects are important only in the long term and find significant measures of long-horizon exposure. However, it isn't hard to believe that a crisis differs from a period of normal exchange rate fluctuations in many regards. As a result, one might suspect firms' returns are affected by drastic changes in the exchange rate even in the short horizon.
To account for the possibility that a crisis is what is important in estimating exposure, I add an early warning system crisis indicator to the model. That is, I allow returns to be affected by exchange rate movement during crises differently than in months of normal exchange rate fluctuations. Allowing for this, I find firms are either significantly exposed to normal exchange rate fluctuations or crisis fluctuations, not both, and, the percent of the firms in the sample with significant exposure rises to 24 percent.
The median (mean) monthly exposure of U.S. MNEs between 1995 and 1999 is -0.25 (-0.37), which says a one percent appreciation of the U.S. dollar against the currencies where the MNE has operations causes the monthly returns to fall by ¼ (a) percentage points. This result is consistent 3 with other studies (e.g., Allayannis and Ihrig). Focusing solely on significantly exposed firms, the median (mean) exposure rises to -0.63 (-0.68) , saying a one percent appreciation of the dollar causes returns to fall by more than ½ percentage points.
These exposure estimates hide the fact that there is a huge difference in the value of exposure for firms during normal periods of exchange rate movement and periods of crises. Considering the significantly exposed firms, exposure averages -0.55 during periods of normal exchange rate fluctuations, but during a crisis, exposure jumps to -2.79. Since the average appreciation of the MNE-specific dollar during a crisis is 1.6 percent, this implies the average decline in a firm's monthly return is 4.4 percent during a crisis month. This is consistent with Forbes (2001) who finds returns fall 15 (10) percentage points through the duration of the Asian (Russian) crisis.
Focusing on MNE characteristics, one finds that the more subsidiaries and/or more countries of operation, the higher a firm's exposure. Similarly, MNEs that only operate in one country besides the United States have an average exposure of -0.04, while MNEs operating in at least 20 countries have an exposure of nearly -0.12. This is consistent with the view that the more foreign operations an MNE has the larger is its exchange-rate exposure, because it is more likely that its balance sheet is affected by exchange rate movement since it is more likely to be located in a country with a crisis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the models used to estimate exposure, building off the Jorion (1990) 
I. Model
The starting point for estimating exposure is the Jorion (1990) More discussion of the MNE-specific exchange rate is found in the data section. So the model becomes:
Last, to account for the fact that exchange-rate crisis periods may affect a firm's balance sheet, and hence return, more dramatically than normal exchange rate movements, an additional term is introduced in the model that captures the effect of a crisis on exposure. The model is: 
II. Data
The data for this project is the standard variables in exchange-rate exposure research except that I adjust the exchange-rate data to capture more detailed data about MNE-specific location characteristics in (1) the definition of the exchange rate and (2) in incorporating exchange-rate crisis information. The sample contains monthly data on 226 MNEs that I use to estimate exposure over the 5-year interval 1995-1999, so that there are 13560 firm-year observations in the sample. Table   1A presents summary statistics for the basic regressions.
Returns: Monthly nonfinancial industry returns are retrieved from the University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Dividends are included in the prices used to calculate firm returns. The CRSP monthly value-weighted market index is used as the market portfolio.
3 Ideally one would want sales data of the subsidiaries so that the weights not only account for each foreign operation but weigh them appropriately. The National Registry does not provide detailed subsidiary data. As a sensitivity analysis, I also created country-specific exchange rates where each country the MNE operates in gets equal weight in the exchange rate. The correlation of the country weighted exchange rate with the sub-ER is 0.97. Estimation results using the country-weighted exchange rates were similar. Table 1B . An MNE, on average, has 20.6 subsidiaries, with the minimum number of subsidiaries being one for 27 firms and the maximum number of subsidiaries is 402 for Hewlett-Packard Company. On average, an MNE is located in 11.4 countries, with the minimum being one and the maximum being 94.
Exchange rate: As a reference exchange rate, I consider the JPMorgan Broad exchange rate index. For example, the correlation between FR and KLR is 0.47, while the correlation between FR and KSS is 0.42 (KSS and KLR are more highly correlated at 0.59). 4 Alternatively, I created a crisis indicator that was one if any of the countries the MNE was located in has a crisis and, I created a country weighted crisis as well. The correlation between sub-I and these alternatives 0.65 and 0.96, respectively. 
III. Exposure Estimates
To begin, I run the standard Jorion regressions, equation (1), on the data using the JP Morgan broad exchange rate. The results, presented in the first column of Table 2 Next I run the Jorion exchange-rate adjusted regressions, equation (2), where the MNEspecific exchange rates are used. Table 2 , column 2, shows there is only minor change in the median exposure, with it rising from -0.23 to -0.20. As the quartiles suggest, most values of exposure are near the median value, with a small proportion of exposure values at the tails of the distribution. The number of firms with significant exposure rises to 16 percent at the 10 percent level, this is a significant change in the number of firms with significant exposure. The median exposure of significantly exposed firms is -1.2.
Finally I estimate exposure allowing for crisis periods to affect a firm's return differently than normal exchange rate fluctuations, as in equation (3). analysis shows that firms are either significantly exposed to exchange rate movement through β 1 or β 2 , only one firm is effected through both terms. Hence, 27 percent of the sample (37/137) is significantly exposed to exchange rate movements. One would expect that this model more accurately estimates exposure than the Jorion type models since the latter have to capture the effects of both the extreme and modest fluctuations in the exchange rate on returns in one coefficient estimate. To give some perspective on this, if one takes the 137 MNE sample and reruns the Jorion exchange-rate adjusted model, less than 7 percent of the sample (9/137 firms) are significantly exposed, in comparison with the 27 percent when the crisis period effect is separated.
For the MNEs that experienced a crisis between 1995 and 1999, the median (mean) exposure was -0.25 (-0.37). For the significantly exposed firms, the median (mean) exposure was more than twice as large, at -0.63 (-0.68 ). This suggests an appreciation of the dollar decreased a firm's return, on average, 0.67 percentage points.
Given that the MNEs experienced a limited number of crises, the average exposure value is not suggestive of the value of exposure during a crisis. On average MNEs experienced two months 11 of crises over the 60 months between 1995:1 and 1999:12, although four firms (DE, HWP, JNJ, UN) had ten months with subsidiaries in crisis countries. The significantly exposed firms had exposure that averaged -0.55 during periods of normal exchange rate fluctuations, but during a crises, exposure averaged -2.79. Since the average appreciation of the MNE-specific dollar during a crisis was 1.6 percent, the average decline in a firm's monthly return was 4.4 percent solely from the impact of movement in the dollar. Hence results in Table 3 suggest crisis periods are just as important as non-crisis periods in terms of number of significant firms but even more important in terms of the magnitude of the effect on returns. For HON, 2.2 percent of its subsidiaries where located in countries with a crisis in January of 1999. In this month HON's dollar exchange rate appreciated over 1.5 percent and their stock return fell nearly 12 percent (HON's estimated exposure is -3.7 in January 1999), while the market return rose 3.8 percent. Looking across periods with crises, one sees that HON's return rose less than the market return, fell more than the market return or fell when the market return rose. Each 12 of these three outcomes is consistent with the story that an appreciation of the dollar causes subsidiaries' profits, in terms of foreign currency, to lose value in terms of U.S. dollars (this assumes HON cannot adjust their prices to counter the effect of the crisis, which seems reasonable in periods of exchange rate crises).
To get the entire picture of what exposure looks like, one should combine the exposure estimates of the MNEs who experienced a crisis with the 89 other MNEs that did not experience a crisis in the 1995-1999 period. Doing this (results not shown), 25 percent of the sample is significantly exposed to exchange rate movement, with a median exposure of -0.46. For those who are significantly exposed, the median exposure is -0.42 and the mean is -0.54. So by adjusting the model to account for some basic exchange rate issues, one finds much more significant exposure than the Jorion model finds. This is of interest since the model excludes issues of trade shares, markups, or pass-though, all of which have been used in previous studies to argue there is more exposure than found by the Jorion model, but measures of which are hard to obtain and, perhaps, poorly estimated. 5 In addition, the average value of exposure estimate with these exchange rate considerations is larger than previous estimates suggest. This is because the current framework separates the effect of exchange rate movements on returns during crisis periods and periods of normal exchange-rate fluctuations and, therefore, estimate exposure more precisely.
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Focusing on the MNE characteristics of the data sample, Table 4 These results suggest exposure is a function of foreign operations.
Last I test the sensitivity of my analysis to a different sample period and different crises indicators. 6 Each sensitivity analysis is reported in Table 5 and each suggests the results are robust.
Column 1 reports estimation coefficients of the Jorion exchange-rate adjusted regression for the 1990-1994 sample period, with the caveat that the MNE subsidiary location information is for 1998
and may be slightly out of date. Estimation suggests 19 percent of the sample has significance exposure, with the median exposure of -0.04. This is a slightly larger number of firms that have significant exposure than found in Table 1 , column 2, and again illustrates that having a more appropriate exchange rate suggests more exposure than previously estimated. Columns 2 and 3 report the estimation results when the KRL and KSS crisis indicators are used in the analysis. In both cases the median exposure is in line with the FR analysis and, the significantly exposed MNEs represents over 20 percent of the sample, similar to the results using the FR crisis indicator. Hence both tests suggest the implied conclusions are robust.
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IV. Conclusion
This paper took the basic Jorion (1990) model for estimating exposure and adapted it to incorporate two specific exchange-rate issues. First I introduced MNE-specific exchange rates in the analysis.
Second, I adjusted the model to allow exposure to differ between periods of normal exchange rate fluctuations and during crises. These two simple modifications suggest that exposure is much more prevalent than the Jorion (1990) estimates suggest.
Estimation results suggests ¼ of all U.S. nonfinancial MNEs have significant exchange rate exposure between 1995 and 1999. On average, significant exposure is estimated to be 0.68, indicating that these firms find their monthly returns fall, on average, by 0.68 percentage points when the dollar appreciates one percent. This encompasses periods where there are normal fluctuations in the exchange rate and the average exposure is 0.55, as well as crisis periods where the average exposure is 2.8. Given that the average appreciation of the MNE-specific dollar during a crisis between 1995-99 was 1.6 percent, the average decline in a firm's monthly return was 4.4 percent, solely from the impact of movement in the dollar. These results are robust to the time period and early warning system indicator used in the analysis. I conclude that crisis periods are just as important as non-crisis periods in terms of having a significant impact on firms' returns, but even more important in terms of the magnitude of the effect on returns.
Finally, the results illustrate that MNEs operating in more than 20 countries (having more than 30 subsidiaries) have twice the exposure of MNEs who operate in one country (having one subsidiary). So one can say MNEs with more foreign operations are more exposed to exchange rate fluctuations and, perhaps, exposure is a function of foreign operations. 1 9 9 5 0 5 1 9 9 5 0 9 1 9 9 6 0 1 1 9 9 6 0 5 1 9 9 6 0 9 1 9 9 7 0 1 1 9 9 7 0 5 1 9 9 7 0 9 1 9 9 8 0 1 1 9 9 8 0 4 1 9 9 8 0 8 1 9 9 8 1 2 1 9 9 9 0 4 1 9 9 9 0 8
BDX Return Market Return Crisis Indicator
The severity of the crisis (in terms of percent of its subsidiaries in crisis countries) is indicated by the value of the indicator. For example, in January 1999, 6.25 percent of BDX's subsidiaries were in countries with a crisis. In this month BDX's dollar exchange rate appreciated nearly 2 percent and their stock return fell 16.25 percent (BDX's estimated exposure is -8.4 in January 1999), while the market return rose 3.8 percent. 1 9 9 5 0 5 1 9 9 5 0 9 1 9 9 6 0 1 1 9 9 6 0 5 1 9 9 6 0 9 1 9 9 7 0 1 1 9 9 7 0 5 1 9 9 7 0 9 1 9 9 8 0 1 1 9 9 8 0 4 1 9 9 8 0 8 1 9 9 8 1 2 1 9 9 9 0 4 1 9 9 9 0 8
HON Return Market Return Crisis Indicator
The severity of the crisis (in terms of percent of its subsidiaries in crisis countries) is indicated by the value of the indicator. For example, in January 1999, 2.2 percent of HON's subsidiaries were in countries with a crisis. In this month HON's dollar exchange rate appreciated over 1.5 percent and their stock return fell nearly 12 percent (HON's estimated exposure is -3.7 in January 1999), while the market return rose 3.8 percent.
